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The Impact of “Anti-Sharia” Legislation on
Arbitration and Why Judge Nielsen in Florida Got It
Right
Katherine A. Sanoja*
INTRODUCTION
1

Several cases in the past few years, in addition to growing antiMuslim sentiment in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, have sparked a
wave of debates over the role of foreign and international law in many
2
of the states’ legislatures. In an effort to ban the application of Sharia
law, almost half of the states have proposed legislation containing
blanket prohibitions against the application of foreign or international
3
law by state courts. Although most of the bills and proposed constitu4
tional amendments have died in committees or have failed adoption,
the impulsive reaction of legislatures to draft this type of legislation
demonstrates a distrust and misunderstanding about the relationship
5
between domestic law and international and foreign law.
Beginning in 2010, legislators across the United States proposed
bills and/or constitutional amendments limiting the application and

*

J.D., Florida International University College of Law, 2012.
See, e.g., Mansour v. Islamic Educ. Ctr., No. 08-CA-3497 (Fla. 13th Cir. Ct. Mar. 22, 2011);
S.D. v. M.J.R., 2 A.3d 412 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2010) (reversing lower court’s decision denying a wife’s request for a restraining order against her husband and rejecting lower court’s finding that husband’s religious views caused him to lack criminal intent); Abd Alla v. Mourssi, 680
N.W.2d 569 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004); Jabri v. Qaddura, 108 S.W.3d 404 (Tex. App. 2003).
2
Elizabeth Flock, Sharia Law Ban: Is Oklahoma’s Proposed Ban Discriminatory or
Needed?, WASH. POST (Jan. 11, 2012, 11:55 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/
blogpost/post/sharia-law-ban-is-oklahomas-proposal-discriminatory-or-useful/2012/01/11/gIQAGFP
1qP_blog.html.
3
Robert P. Jones, The State of Anti-Sharia Bills, WASH. POST (Feb. 29, 2012, 3:55 PM),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/figuring-faith/post/the-state-of-”anti-sharia”-bills/2012/02/
29/gIQAql5miR_blog.html.
4
Bill Raftery, Bans on Court Use of Sharia/International Law: Law in Arizona, Bills Advance in Missouri and Texas, Failing in Most States, GAVEL TO GAVEL (May 3, 2011), http://
gaveltogavel.us/site/2011/05/03/bans-on-court-use-of-shariainternational-law-law-in-arizona-bills
-advance-in-missouri-and-texas-failing-in-most-states.
5
See, e.g., Flock, supra note 2; William R. Levesque, Judge Explains Use of Islamic Law,
TAMPA BAY TIMES, Mar. 23, 2011, at 1B.
1
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6

use of foreign and international law. Although so far only four states
7
adopted the proposed legislation, many of the bills that were intro8
duced in 2011 made a comeback in the 2012 legislative session.
Thirty-three bills in total are being considered, fifteen of which were
9
carried over from the 2011 legislative session. The most recent states
to propose bills in this area are Georgia, Mississippi, Kentucky, New
10
Jersey, and Virginia.
The move to propose bans or limitations on the use of international or foreign law has significant constitutional implications under
the First and Fourteenth Amendments and has the potential to undermine commercial and social intercourse through private arbitration. Part I briefly touches on the political and social contours that
prompted legislatures to consider this issue. Part II offers a historical
reflection on arbitration and the choice-of-law clause, and the limitations on the recognition of party autonomy and choice-of-law provisions under the principle of “freedom to contract.” Part III provides
an analysis of relevant case law on the recognition of choice of foreign
law clauses and the application of international law in domestic cases.
Finally, Part IV is a critical analysis of legislation that has been enacted into law, and the impact such legislation will have on arbitration
and international business transactions.
I. BACKGROUND
In Florida, Circuit Court Judge Richard A. Nielsen was severely
criticized by conservatives and the media after his decision to uphold
the application of Sharia law to a dispute between parties involved

6
Aaron Fellmeth, International Law and Foreign Laws in the U.S. State Legislatures,
INSIGHTS (May 26, 2011), http://www.asil.org/insights110526.cfm (22 states proposed legislation
by 2011).
7
H.B. 2064, 50th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2011) (approved on Apr. 12, 2011, effective
Apr. 13, 2011) (codified at 2011 Ariz. Sess. Laws Ch. 22); H.J.R. 1056, 52d Leg., 2d Sess. (Okla.
2010) (Okla. “Save Our State” Const. Amend., amending art. 7, §1); H.B. 785, 2010 Reg. Sess. (La.
2010) (approved June 29, 2010; effective Aug. 15, 2010) (codified at 2011 La. R.S. 9:6000); H.B.
3768, 106th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2010 ) (approved May, 27, 2010) (codified at 2010
Tenn. Pub. Act. 983).
8
Bill Raftery, Bans on Court Use of Sharia/International Law: 33 Bills in 20 States to Start
2012; Review of All Efforts since 2010, GAVEL TO GAVEL (Jan. 30, 2012),
http://gaveltogavel.us/site/2012/01/30/bans-on-court-use-of-shariainternational-law-33-bills-in-20states-to-start-2012-review-of-all-efforts-since-2010.
9
Id.
10 H.B. 631, 2012 Reg. Sess. (Va. 2012) (introduced Jan. 11 2012); A919, 215th Leg., Reg.
Sess. (N.J. 2012) (Pre-filed on Jan. 10, 2012); H.B. 698, 106th Gen. Assemb., 2012 Reg. Sess. (Miss.
2012); 2012 Reg. Sess. H.B. 386 (Ky. 2012); S.R. 926, 2011-2012 Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2012) (Const.
Amend.).
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11

with the Islamic Education Center in Tampa. Both parties had initially agreed to the application of Sharia law to their dispute in arbi12
tration. However, after the arbitration, the losing party sought to
invalidate the award in state court on the basis that the application of
Sharia law was unconstitutional and that Florida law should decide
13
the dispute. The judge ruled that the two parties were bound by the
rules they set forth in their own arbitration agreement and that the
court’s only role was to ensure that the rules agreed upon, in this case
14
based on Sharia, were followed. Even though the judge affirmed the
application of Sharia law, he applied Sharia only because the princi15
ples of United States’ contract law dictated that result.
This Florida case is the type of case cited by “anti-Sharia” legislation proponents as an example of the intrusion of Sharia into our legal
16
system. David Yerulshami, general counsel for the Center for Security Policy, a Washington-based research institute, has been at the fore17
front of the anti-Sharia movement. Much of the proposed legislation
has been modeled after “anti-Sharia” legislation drafted by Mr.
18
Yerulshami himself.

11 Levesque, supra note 5; see also Should Rulings Under Any Law but US Law Be Allowed?, RUSH LIMBAUGH REPORT (Mar. 24, 2011), http://rushlimbaughreport.
blogspot.com/2011/03/should-rulings-under-any-law-but-us-law.html.
12 Mansour v. Islamic Educ. Ctr., No. 08-CA-3497, at *3 (Fla. 13th Cir. Ct. Mar. 22, 2011).
13 See id. at *2.
14 Id. at *4; see also William R. Levesque, Appeals Court Will Not Stop Hillsborough Judge
from Considering Islamic Law, TAMPA BAY TIMES (Oct. 25, 2011), http://www.
tampabay.com/news/courts/civil/appeals-court-wont-stop-hillsborough-judge-from-consideringislamic-law/1198321 (appellate court denied a petition filed by the Islamic Education Center
challenging Judge Nielsen’s decision).
15 Mansour, No. 08-CA-3497, at * 4 (judge ruled based on neutral principles of contract law
which grant deference to the parties’ choice of law as long as it does not violate public policy).
16 CENTER FOR SECURITY POLICY, SHARIAH LAW AND AMERICAN STATE COURTS: AN
ASSESSMENT OF APPELLATE COURT CASES 11, 165-69 (May 20, 2011), available at
http://shariahinamericancourts.com.
17 Andrea Elliott, Behind an Anti-Shariah Push, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 31, 2011, at A1; see also
Dispelling the Sharia Threat Myth: Implications of Banning Courts from Referencing Religious,
Foreign or International Law [hereinafter Dispelling Sharia Threat],Webinar held by the American Bar Association Section of Individual Rights and Responsibilities and the ABA Center for
Continuing Legal Education (Dec 7, 2011) (CD-ROM on file at Florida International University
Library); Pamela Geller, Oklahoma’s Amendment Banning Shariah, ATLAS SHRUGS (Nov. 29,
2010), http://atlasshrugs2000.typepad.com/atlas_shrugs/2010/11/oklahoma-amendment-banningshariah.html.
18 Elliott, supra note 17; see also Matt Sedensky, Florida Foreign Law Ban: Measure Banning Shariah, Other Foreign Law Progresses in Statehouse, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 2, 2012),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/03/02/florida-foreign-law-ban-shariah_n_1315873.html.
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Although most of the laws proposed contain blanket provisions
19
banning the application of foreign or international law, the real impetus behind this type of legislation is an increasing fear that Sharia law
20
will enter the United States’ judicial system. One need only take a
look at the language of Tennessee’s 2011 proposed House Bill No.
1353 and Senate Bill No. 1028 to understand the political “reality” that
21
is fueling this type of legislations. Politicians have capitalized on in22
creasing anti-Muslim sentiment and the proposal of anti-Sharia law
provisions as an opportunity to reinforce a concern for United States’
23
sovereignty and national security. The media and politicians have
grasped onto the country’s anti-Muslim sentiment, exaggerating and
24
misconstruing the reality and place of Sharia in the United States.
Illustrating the political xenophobia fueling the proposal of antiSharia legislation, Oklahoma State Representative Rex Duncan
stated, “understand that this is a war for the survival of America. It's a
cultural war, it's a social war, it’s a war for the survival of our coun25
try.”
In order to avoid constitutional issues, states proposing this type
of legislation have done so under the premise of banning the applica26
tion of all international or foreign law domestically in their courts.
19 See, e.g., S.B. 84, 2012 Reg. Sess. (Ala. 2012) (const. amend.); H.B. 1209, 2012 Reg. Sess.
(Fla. 2012); S.B. 1360, 2012 Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2012); S.B. 676, 96th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo.
2012).
20 See generally Sedensky, supra note 18.
21 S.B. 1028, 107th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2011); H.B 1353, 107th Gen. Assemb.,
Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2011) (effective June 16, 2011) (codified at 2011 Tenn. Pub. Act. 497) (Both bills
contain the following language: “Jihad and sharia are inextricably linked . . . [t]he unchanging
and ultimate aim of jihad is the imposition of sharia on all states and nations, including the
United States and this state; further, pursuant to its own dictates, sharia requires the abrogation,
destruction, or violation of the United States and Tennessee Constitutions and the imposition of
sharia through violence and criminal activity.”).
22 See Amaney Jamal, Muslim Americans: Enriching or Depleting American Democracy?,
in RELIGION AND DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES: DANGER OR OPPORTUNITY? 89, 95
(A. Wolfe & I. Katznelson eds., 2010). A 2005 survey showed that “36 percent of the American
population believes Islam encourages violence; another 36 percent reported that they have
unfavorable opinions about Islam.”
23 See Russell Goldman, Bachmann Opposed to Sharia Law, Says it ‘Usurps’ Constitution,
ABC NEWS (Nov. 2. 2011), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2011/11/bachmann-opposed-tosharia-law-says-it-usurps-constitution.
24 Amy Sullivan, The Myth of Sharia Law in America, HUFFINGTON POST ONLINE (Jun. 15,
2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/amy-sullivan/sharia-myth-america_b_876965.html (“We
should have a federal law that says under no circumstances in any jurisdiction in the United
States will sharia be used," Gingrich announced at last fall's Values Voters Summit).
25 Leah Nelson, Oklahoma’s Shariah Law Ban Creates Controversy, INTELLIGENCE
REPORT, Spring 2011, available at http://www.splcenter.org.
26 Although most states have proposed blanket prohibitions without singling out Sharia
law, the titles of some of the proposed legislation demonstrate the political impetus for enacting
these laws. See, e.g., H.J.R. 1056, 52d Leg., 2d Sess. (Okla. 2010) (Okla. “Save Our State” Const.
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However, most of the legislations proposed ban the application of
foreign law only if its application would not afford the same constitutional rights guaranteed by the United States and the respective
27
state’s constitution. Only one state, whose legislation was passed, ex28
pressly mentions Sharia law in its legislation. Since 2010, six states
have passed legislation or constitutional amendments that ban the use
29
of international and foreign law in their domestic courts. In 2012,
Alabama, among other states, sought to introduce a constitutional
amendment banning the application, use, or enforcement of foreign
30
law that would contravene the state’s public policy. Two states, South
31
Dakota and Kansas, enacted anti-Sharia legislation in 2012. South
Dakota’s law expressly outlawed the application or enforcement of
32
any religious law. Prior to the end of the 2012 legislative session,
33
Michigan was attempting to pass its own controversial legislation.
The United States’ disdain for the application of foreign law is
not imbedded in our judicial history to the extent that it is purported

Amend., amending art. 7, §1); S.B. 33, 2012 Reg. Sess. (Ala. 2012) (“American and Alabama Laws
for Alabama Courts Amendment”).
27 See, e.g., S.R. 926, 2011-2012 Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2011) (No recognition or enforcement of any
foreign or religious law that is “contrary to or incompatible with” the U.S. Constitution or the
Constitution of Georgia and the laws, including common law, recognized by the State of Georgia).
28 OKLA. STATE ELECTION BD., STATE QUESTIONS FOR GENERAL ELECTION 7 (Nov. 2,
2010) (Oklahoma passed a constitutional amendment OK HJR 1056, Nov. 2010, which expressly
bans courts from considering Sharia or international law in their decisions.), available at
http://www.ok.gov/elections/documents/sq_gen10.pdf; see also H.B. 698, 106th Gen. Assemb.,
2012 Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2012) (like the Constitutional Amendment in Okla. this bill expressly
singled out Sharia law in its language; bill died in committee).
29 H.B 2064, 50th Leg., 1st. Reg. Sesss. (Ariz. 2011) (approved on Apr. 12, 2011, effective
Apr. 13, 2011) (codified at 2011 Ariz. Sess. Laws Ch. 22); H.J.R. 1056, 52d Leg., 2d Sess. (Okla.
2010) (Okla. “Save Our State” Const. Amend., amending art. 7, §1); H.B. 785, 1st Reg. Sess.(La.
2010) (approved June 29, 2010; effective Aug. 15, 2010) (codified at 2011 La. R.S. 9:6000); H.B.
3768, 106th Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2010) (approved May, 27, 2010) (codified at 2010
Tenn. Pub. Act. 983; 2012); H.B. 1253, 87th Leg., Reg. Sess. (S.D. 2012) (signed into law March 12,
2012); S.B. 79, 2011 Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2011) (signed into law May 21, 2012).
30 See, e.g., S.B. 33, 2012 Reg. Sess. (Ala. 2012); S.J.R. 14, 2012 Reg. Sess. (N.M 2012) (all to
be considered during the 2012 legislative session).
31 H.B. 1253, 87th Leg., Reg. Sess. (S.D. 2012) (signed into law March 12, 2012); S.B. 79, 2012
Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2011) (signed into law May 21, 2012).
32 H.B. 1253, 87th Leg. , Reg. Sess. (S.D. 2012) (prevents any court or administrative body,
including a private arbitration tribunal, from entering a judgment “predicated on a religious
code, or enforce any provisions of any religious code”).
33 H.B. 4769, 96th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2011) (on calendar for a vote on December 14,
2012); ‘Anti-Sharia’ Supporters Push for Action on Michigan House Bill Targeting Islamic Ideology, HUFFINGTON POST ONLINE (Nov. 26, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/11/26/antisharia-law-michigan-house-bill_n_2192221.html (Several groups spoke out against Michigan’s
legislation including the ACLU and Council on American-Islamic of Michigan).
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34

today. In 1820, Justice Joseph Story cited more than twenty-five
35
sources of foreign law. Justice Livingston criticized Justice Story not
for his reliance on foreign law, but rather for the open definition that
36
international law provided. The role of international or foreign law
in domestic judicial decision-making has in recent years been hotly
37
debated. In her 2009 confirmation hearings, Justice Sonia Sotomayor
was asked several times to state her position on the role of interna38
tional or foreign law in judicial decision making.
It is not unusual for domestic courts to enforce foreign law
through choice-of-law clauses that are usually found in contracts or
39
private law instruments such as wills, trusts, and financial instruments.
Legislation proposed or adopted in regards to a blanket prohibition
on the use of foreign or international law by a domestic court would
40
infringe on a court’s ability to enforce choice-of-law clauses. This
type of legislation is bound to have its greatest impact on the utilization of international dispute resolution mechanisms in the United
States because these inevitably involve at least one foreign party and
41
in many instances the application of foreign law. The legislation
would specifically undermine arbitration proceedings because it
would allow ex post facto attacks by the losing party on any award
42
rendered on the basis of the foreign law chosen by the parties. In
other words, the losing party could claim that the application of the
43
foreign law would be contrary to the state’s public policy.
The haste in which states proposed these legislative provisions
demonstrates a lack of proper consideration of the consequences of

34 David J. Seipp, Our Law, Their Law, History and the Citation of Foreign Law, 86 B.U. L.
REV. 1417, 1427 (2006).
35 Id. at 1428.
36 United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat) 153, 181-82 (1820) (Livingston, J., dissenting)
(pointing out that Congress declared piracy to be defined by the “law of nations,” given how
difficult it was hard for a defendant to figure out what constitutes the “law of nations”).
37 Supreme Court Justices Spar Over International Law, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Jan. 18, 2005),
http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1105364112559&slreturn=1.
38 Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Hon. Sonia Sotomayor, To Be An Associate
Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
111th. Cong. 132-33 (2009) (explaining her position on the role of international law in domestic
legal decision-making) [hereinafter Sotomayor Confirmation Hearing].
39 Aziz Z. Huq, Private Religious Discrimination, National Security, and the First Amendment, 5 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 347, 370 (2011).
40 Id.
41 Stephen T. Ostrowski & Yuval Shany, Chromalloy: United States Law and International
Arbitration at the Crossroads, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1650, 1650-51 (1998) (“Arbitration as a means of
effective international dispute resolution has grown rapidly over the last twenty-five years, and
most transnational contracts today contain some provision for arbitration.”).
42 See, e.g., Mansour v. Islamic Educ. Ctr., No. 08-CA-3497 (Fla. 13th Cir. Ct. Mar. 22, 2011).
43 Id.
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enacting them into law. This type of legislation seeks to prevent state
courts from exercising some of their most basic functions, including
enforcement of commercial contracts, inter-country adoptions, foreign
marriages, Native American treaties, foreign judgments, faith-based
dispute resolution mechanisms, and cases of international child abduc45
tion. In addition to the intended goal of banning the application of
Sharia by the courts, this type of legislation carries with it many unintended consequences including far-reaching effects on the enforceability of international arbitration agreements and an increased uncer46
tainty in the outcome of litigation or arbitration.
II. HISTORICAL UNDERPININGS OF CONTRACTUAL LAW
Capitalism has flourished under a principle of “freedom to con47
48
tract,” which is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. Freedom
of contract represents the ultimate exercise of liberty, as embodied in
49
the Declaration of Independence, between two parties to exchange
50
resources. Contracts are based on the common law principle that
“private agreements should be enforced in accordance with their
51
terms.” Therefore, the ability of parties to enter into private agreements and to resolve their private disputes through private arbitration
is a legitimate exercise of the freedom guaranteed under the Four52
teenth Amendment.
The Supreme Court has recognized that “[t]here are compelling
reasons why a freely negotiated private international agreement, unaffected by fraud, undue influence, or overweening bargaining power . . .
53
should be given full effect.” In the words of Justice Erle, “[e]very
man is the master of the contract he may choose to make: and it is of
the highest importance that every contract should be construed ac-

44 See Dara Kam, Anti-Sharia Law Bill Heads to Senate Floor, PALM BEACH POST (Mar. 5,
2012, 5:58 PM), http://www.palmbeachpost.com/news/state/”anti-sharia”-law-bill-heads-tosenate-floor-2218704.html. Although the bill eventually died in the Senate on Mar. 9, 2012, the
Senate Committee only deliberated three minutes before signing off on the bill.
45 Dispelling Sharia Threat, supra note 17.
46 Id.
47 See generally MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 2-3 (40th ed. 2002).
48 See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905).
49 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
50 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BUSINESS ETHICS AND SOCIETY 444 (Robert W. Kolb ed. 2008).
51 Richard A. Epstein, Unconscionability: A Critical Reappraisal, 18 J. L. & ECON. 293
(1975).
52 See generally Lochner, 198 U.S. at 45.
53 M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1972); see also Larry E. Ribstein,
Choosing Law by Contract, 18 J. CORP. L. 245, 246-55 (1993) (“Uncertainty about choice-of-law
at the time of litigation can increase both the costs and frequency of litigation.”).
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cording to the intention of the contracting parties.” On that same
note, in order to protect the reasonable expectations of the parties and
increase judicial economy and predictability, courts generally give full
55
effect to a parties’ valid choice-of-law clause.
Courts have found few exceptions to the policy of noninterference with the freedom of contract, setting aside the provisions
agreed upon by parties of a dispute only under certain limited circum56
stances. The common law has recognized grounds for disregarding
contractual provisions under fraud, duress, incompetence, and uncon57
scionability.
The general rule is that parties should enjoy complete freedom to
58
contract. In other words, “competent persons shall have the utmost
liberty of contracting and that their agreements voluntarily and fairly
59
made shall be held valid and enforced in the courts.” Courts have
long held a view of non-interference with this freedom unless neces60
sary, based on public policy grounds.
This power to void a contract based on public policy is limited as
61
recognized in Richmond v. Dubuque. In that case, the court noted
the limits on its power to void a contract that contravenes public policy stating that this power “is a very delicate and undefined power, and,
like the power to declare a statute unconstitutional, should be exercised only
62
in cases free from doubt.”
Similarly, a result contrary to that which might result in a domestic court under domestic law is an insufficient ground to reject a
63
choice-of-law clause. Courts have recognized that the “fact that an
international transaction may be subject to laws and remedies different and less favorable than those of the United States” is not sufficient
to justify the denial of that choice of law unless the law is inherently
64
unfair.
54

Clarke v. Watson, [1865] 18 C.B. (N.S.) 278, 284, 144 Eng. Rep. 450, 452.
See, e.g., M/S Bremen, 407 U.S. at 12-15 (finding that “[t]he elimination of all such uncertainties by agreeing in advance on a forum acceptable to both parties is an indispensable element
in international trade, commerce, and contracting”).
56 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 (1971).
57 See generally Epstein, supra note 51.
58 Twin City Pipe Line Co. v. Harding Glass Co., 283 U.S. 353, 356 (1931).
59 Id.
60 See Syester v. Banta, 133 N.W.2d 666, 668 (Iowa 1965) (“Since the beginning of recorded
history men and women have persisted in selling their birthrights for a mess of pottage and
courts cannot protect against the folly of bad judgment.”).
61 Richmond v. Dubuque, 26 Iowa 191, 202 (1868).
62 Id.
63 See, e.g., Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 629
(1985); Lipcon v. Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London, 148 F.3d 1285, 1297 (11th Cir. 1998).
64 Riley v. Kingsley Underwriting Agencies, Ltd., 969 F.2d 953, 958 (10th Cir. 1992), cert.
denied, 506 U.S. 1021 (1992).
55
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The Supreme Court has relied on “concerns of international comity, respect for the capacities of foreign and transnational tribunals,
and sensitivity to the need of the international commercial system for
predictability in the resolution of disputes” as a basis for its decision
65
to enforce a party’s agreement.
The question then becomes whether the application of foreign
law or international law in the arbitration of disputes goes against
public policy. As a starting point, the following section will provide an
exploration of the limitations imposed on choice-of-law clauses.
The Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws enumerates two
main considerations for limiting the application of the contract’s
66
choice of law. First, the contract’s choice of law should be utilized if
the issue in dispute is one that the parties could have resolved by ex67
plicit provision in their agreement. Second, the law will be applied to
the issue, even if an explicit provision would not have resolved it,
unless (1) the chosen forum has no reasonable relationship to the parties or the contract and no other reasonable basis is apparent or (2)
the application of the law would be contrary to the state’s public policy, an interest that outweighs that of the state whose law was contractually chosen, and the determination of the issue, in the absence of a
valid choice-of-law clause, would by default be governed by the law of
68
that state. This latter exception has broad implications and requires
the exploration of what is meant by “public policy.”
The general rule is that any contract or foreign law that contravenes a state statute or constitution can be said to violate that state’s
69
public policy. There are, however, instances where the contract itself
does not violate a statute or constitutional provision, particularly
where there is no statute on point to regulate the conduct at issue, but
the court nevertheless finds the contract to be against the public pol70
icy of that forum.

65

Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 629; see also Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 518-19

(1974).
66

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 (1988).
Id.
68 Id.
69 See, e.g., Harris v. Gonzalez, 789 So. 2d 405, 409 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (“A contract which
violates a provision of the constitution or a statute is void and illegal, and, will not be enforced in
our courts.”).
70 See, e.g., Davies v. Grossmont Union High Sch. Dist., 930 F.2d 1390, 1396 (9th Cir. 1991)
(balancing the public interest that would served by enforcement versus the public interest that
would be furthered by non-enforcement); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §
178 (1981) (If no legislation regulates the conduct at issue, courts must weigh the parties' and
public interest in enforcement of the contract against the strength of the public policy implicated
by the contract and the furtherance of such policy by failure to enforce the contract.).
67
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The term “public policy” itself is ambiguous. In the 1800s, William W. Story recognized this ambiguity when he pointed out that the
nature of public policy is “so uncertain and fluctuating, varying with
the habits and fashions of the day, with the growth of commerce and
the usages of trade, that it is difficult to determine its limits with any
72
degree of exactness.” In a more recent case in Florida, the court ac73
knowledged that “public policy” is not easily defined. The court in
that case referred to public policy as “the community common sense
and common conscience, extended and applied throughout the state
to matters of public morals, public health, public safety, public welfare,
74
and the like.”
If foreign law is implicated, a court determining which law to ap75
ply should reject the foreign law if it violates public policy. In the
words of Justice Cardozo, one would need to find that the foreign law
would “violate some fundamental principle of justice, some prevalent
conception of good morals, some deep-rooted tradition of the com76
mon weal.” Contracts governed by foreign law may be found void or
77
unenforceable if contrary to the forum state’s public policy. Florida
has recognized that it cannot impose its public policy to prohibit the
enforcement of a foreign contract outside its borders, but within its
78
courts it may do so. In Alabama, a proposed constitutional amendment defines its public policy “to prohibit anyone from requiring Ala79
bama courts to apply and enforce foreign laws.” By defining the application of foreign law itself as against the state’s public policy, Alabama has expressly excluded foreign law, regardless of whether the
“foreign law” actually contravenes public policy as traditionally defined by the courts. In other words, Alabama’s knee-jerk reaction to
enact legislation in this area has removed any discretion from the
judges to consider public policy in their decisions.
Notwithstanding Alabama’s proposed legislation, the definition
of public policy generally remains vague and limitless in most states,
and the issue now is whether our courts have done a good job of protecting judicial decisions from the influence of foreign law that con71

WILLIAM W. STORY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 675 (5th ed. 1874).
Id.
73 Harris v. Gonzalez, 789 So. 2d 405, 409 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001).
74 Id.
75 See, e.g., Willard v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 193 S.E.2d 776, 778 (Va. 1973).
76 Herbert F. Goodrich, Foreign Facts and Local Fancies, 25 VA. L. REV. 26, 33-34 (1938).
77 See, e.g., Turner v. Capitol Motors Transp. Co., 214 F. Supp. 545, 547 (D. Me. 1963).
78 Harris, 789 So. 2d at 409 (finding a contract unenforceable in Florida between a doctor
and a supplement wholesaler because it violated public policy since the doctor would receive a
portion of the profits in return for referring patients in violation of state legislation).
79 S.B. 33 § (b)(7), 2012 Reg. Sess. (Ala. 2012).
72
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travenes United States’ public policy. In other words, does our public
policy warrant additional protections as zealously advanced by antiSharia organizations that fear the infiltration of foreign law into our
judicial decisions?
After looking at case law in various states where “anti-Sharia”
legislation has been proposed, the only reasonable conclusion is that
this type of legislation is not justified and only demonstrates a distrust
80
of our judicial system. Before addressing this in more detail, an
overview of United States courts’ treatment of choice-of-law clauses
will demonstrate the historical and current practice of courts to allow
parties to enter into contracts voluntarily, and, with very little limitation, to allow parties to decide the law that will apply to their dispute.
III. CASE LAW: GIVING EFFECT TO CHOICE-OF-LAW CLAUSES
Courts in the United States have a long history of giving effect to
choice-of-law clauses unless doing so would violate a matter of public
81
policy. Under the principle of freedom to contract, choice-of-law
clauses are generally enforced so long as they do not violate a public
82
policy and there is a reasonable basis for the parties’ choice of law.
A choice-of-law clause allows parties to a contract to choose the
law that will govern their contract and that which will apply should a
83
dispute arise. Legislation banning the use or application of foreign,
Sharia, or international law would have a significant effect on parties’
ability to freely choose the norms by which to govern their contracts
84
and to freely consent to the application of a particular law. Respect
for a party’s choice-of-law provides predictability and confidence to
the parties that the court will enforce their contractual rights based on
85
the norms to which they have consented. Otherwise, parties’ expec80 See Nothing to Fear: Debunking the Mythical “Sharia Threat” to Our Judicial System, 1, 5
ACLU
(May
2011), available
at
http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/Nothing_To_Fear_
Report_FINAL_MAY_2011.pdf; Dispelling Sharia Threat, supra note 17.
81 See, e.g., L’Arbalete, Inc. v. Zaczac, 474 F. Supp. 2d 1314, 1321 (S.D. Fla. 2007) (noting
that choice-of-law provisions are presumed valid unless the party seeking to avoid enforcement
of them sufficiently carries the burden of showing that the foreign law contravenes strong public
policy of the forum jurisdiction).
82 Applera Corp. v. MP Biomedicals, LLC, 93 Cal. Rptr. 3d 178 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009) (finding that there was a reasonable basis for the choice of Swiss law and application of Swiss law to
award attorney fees to prevailing party would not violate public policy).
83 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 275 (9th ed. 2009) (choice-of-law clause is defined as “a
contractual provision by which the parties designate the jurisdiction whose law will govern any
disputes that may arise between the parties”).
84 See Dispelling Threat of Sharia, supra note 17.
85 Charles R. Calleros, Toward Harmonization and Certainty in Choice-of-Law Rules For
International Contracts: Should the U.S. Adopt the Equivalent of Rome I?, 28 WIS. INT’L L. J. 639,
641-42 (2011).
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tations would be unprotected, and the resulting lack of certainty and
unpredictability would undermine the contractual relationship and
86
commitment to perform as agreed upon.
The Supreme Court has consistently recognized the presumptive
87
validity of choice of forum and choice-of-law provisions. In M/S
Bremen v. Zapata Offshore Co., the Court held that courts should enforce choice of law clauses in cases of “freely negotiated private inter88
national agreement[s].” The Court, in essence, affirmed the right of
89
contracting parties to choose their method of dispute resolution.
The Court went on to state that choice-of-law clauses are generally enforceable, subject to the following limitations: (1) choice of law
must be unaffected by fraud, undue influence, or overweening bargaining power; (2) enforcement of chosen laws must not be unreasonable or unjust to the party seeking a remedy; and (3) enforcement of
90
the choice of law must not be contrary to public policy.
States have also recognized choice-of-law provisions granting
91
them presumed validity “unless the party seeking to avoid enforcement of them sufficiently carries the burden of showing that the for92
eign law contravenes strong public policy of the forum jurisdiction.”
Placing the burden on the party attempting to avoid enforcement of a
foreign law in an international transaction reinforces the premise
“that American parochialism would hinder the expansion of American business and trade, and more generally, interfere with the smooth
93
functioning and growth of global commerce.”
A. Choice of Law in Arbitration
In arbitration, the freedom of the parties is generally broader
than in traditional judicial proceedings because party autonomy is at
94
the heart of arbitration. A voluntary and consensual process drives
95
arbitration. Parties have the ability to agree to choose procedural

86

Id.
M/S Bremen v. Zapata Offshore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 10 (1972).
88 Id. at 12.
89 Id. at 12-14.
90 Id. at 14-18.
91 See, e.g., Mazzoni Farms, Inc. v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 761 So. 2d. 306, 311 (Fla.
2000); Phillips v. Audio Active Ltd., 494 F.3d 378, 384 (2d Cir. 2007); Richards v. Lloyd’s of London, 135 F.3d 1289, 1294 (9th Cir. 1998).
92 See, e.g., L’Arbalete Inc. v. Zaczac, 474 F. Supp. 2d. 1314, 1321 (S.D. Fla. 2007).
93 GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS 420
(1996); see M/S Bremen, 407 U.S. at 9.
94 See Cindy G. Buys, The Arbitrators’ Duty to Respect the Parties’ Choice-of-Law in Commercial Arbitration, 79 ST. JOHN’S L. R. 59, 59-61 (2005).
95 See id. at 59.
87
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rules, control the range of the remedies to some extent, and choose
96
the substantive law to govern their contract. In part, this is due to the
97
need to assure predictability in the commercial contractual setting.
Historically, choice-of-law clauses in arbitration agreements were
not greeted as warmly in the United States as choice-of-law clauses in
98
contracts seeking enforcement in judicial settings. This attitude has
99
since changed. This shift was best reflected in the Mitsubishi opinion:
As international trade has expanded in recent decades, so too has
the use of international arbitration to resolve disputes arising in
the course of that trade. . . . If [arbitration tribunals] are to take a
central place in the international legal order, national courts will
need to “shake off the old judicial hostility to arbitration,” (citation omitted) and also their customary and understandable unwillingness to cede jurisdiction of a claim arising under domestic
100
law to a foreign or transnational tribunal.
Now in conflict of law decisions, party autonomy has become in101
creasingly respected by jurisdictions across the world.
In contracts involving interstate commerce, which include an arbitration clause, federal law prempts state law in governing the enforceability of those contracts. Specifically, the Federal Arbitration
102
Act (“FAA”) applies to interstate contracts and “establishes a national policy favoring arbitration when the parties contract for that

96 U.N. Comm. on Int’l Trade Law, UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial
Arbitration, art. 5, 8, 19, 28, 34, 36, U.N. Sales No. E.08.V.4 (2006).
97 See generally Kuehn v. Childrens Hospital, Los Angeles, 119 F.3d 1296 (7th Cir. 1997).
Generally, choice-of-law clauses are enforced because of the need to provide predictability to the
parties and to protect the parties' expectations, and therefore in the absence of a valid choice-oflaw clause, the parties expectations would not be frustrated by the court’s choice-of-law determination.
98 Buys, supra note 94, at 63-64 (quoting J. Stewart McClendon & Rosable E. Everard
Goodman, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION IN NEW YORK 114 (1986); see also
M/S Bremen, 409 U.S. at 9-10 (recognizing that historically “[m]any courts, federal and state, have
declined to enforce such clauses on the ground that they were ‘contrary to public policy,’ or that
their effect was to ‘oust the jurisdiction of the court’”).
99 Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 507 (1974) (finding that “a contractual provision specifying in advance the forum for litigating disputes and the law to be applied is an almost
indispensable precondition to achieving the orderliness and predictability essential to any international business transaction”).
100 Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 638 (1985) (quoting Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 985 (2d Cir. 1942)).
101 Matthias Lehmann, Liberating the Individual from Battles Between States: Justifying
Party Autonomy in Conflict of Laws, 41 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 381, 385 (2008). The Institute of
International Law calls party autonomy “one of the fundamental principles in private international law.” Id.; Institute of International Law, Resolution on the Autonomy of the Parties in International Contracts Between Private Persons or Entities, 64 II Y.B. 383 (1991).
102 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).
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103

mode of dispute resolution.” Even when parties have chosen state
law to control the contract, the arbitration clause is governed by the
104
FAA. The Supreme Court has held that in interstate commercial
transactions, the FAA preempts state law in enforcing an agreement
105
to arbitrate. Although the FAA contains preemptive force in favor
106
of arbitration, this power may be limited in state court proceedings.
For example, the FAA’s procedural rules do not necessarily apply in
107
state proceedings. However, FAA’s substantive rules would apply in
108
federal as well as state courts. This would lead to the conclusion that
the FAA preempts any state law, including any anti-Sharia legislation
that would bar the enforcement of a party’s choice-of-law clause in a
contract or arbitration agreement.
In Preston v. Ferrer, the United States Supreme Court reinforced
the federal policy favoring arbitration by emphasizing that this “national policy . . . applies in state as well as federal courts [and] forecloses any state legislative attempts to undercut the enforceability of
109
arbitration agreements.” This language strongly suggests that parties
attempting to stay arbitration proceedings on the grounds that foreign
law is being applied would be forced, unless otherwise provided for in
110
their contract, to decide those issues before an arbitration panel.
Turning to the anti-Sharia and anti-foreign or international law
statutes promulgated by a large portion of the states’ legislatures, the
issue then becomes not whether the arbitration tribunal would not
enforce the parties’ choice of law, but if they did, would the arbitral
award be enforceable? In a hypothetical situation, two parties sign a
contract with both arbitration and choice-of-law clauses that require
that the arbitration be governed by Sharia law. Subsequently, the par103

Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346, 349 (2008).
Id.
105 Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 275-76, 281 (1995) (holding
where object of contract containing arbitration clause involves interstate commerce, clause is
enforceable under FAA).
106 See Howard S. Suskin & Stuart D. Polizzi, A Cautionary Reminder About the Unique
Application of the Federal Arbitration Act in State Court Proceedings, 38 SEC. REG. & L. REP.
2066 (2006).
107 Id.; see also Atl. Painting & Contracting Inc. v. Nashville Bridge Co., 670 S.W.2d 841, 84647 (Ky. 1984); Simmons Co. v. Deutsche Fin. Servs. Corp., 532 S.E.2d 436, 439-40 (Ga. Ct. App.
2000).
108 M. Praveen Chakravarthy, Philosophy of Commercial Arbitration, FINANCIAL TIMES
(June 4, 1999).
109 Preston, 552 U.S. at 353 (citing Southland Corp., v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16 (1984)).
110 See Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 445-49 (2006) (finding that
“regardless of whether the challenge is brought in federal or state court, a challenge to the validity of the contract as a whole, and not specifically to the arbitration clause, must go to the arbitrator”); see generally Archis A. Parasharami & Kevin Ranlett, Supreme Court Addresses Volt’s
Choice-of-Law Trap: Is the End of the Problem in Sight?, 64 DISP. RESOL. J. 22, 26 (2009).
104
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ties submit their dispute to an arbitral tribunal. The arbitration panel
applies Sharia law and issues an award in favor of one party. Thereafter, the winning party seeks enforcement of that award in Oklahoma
111
Following these hypowhich has enacted anti-Sharia legislation.
thetical facts, the court in Oklahoma would now have to vacate the
award on the basis that it violates state law because the court, under
the new constitutional amendment, “shall not consider international
law or Sharia law.”
Anti-Sharia legislation banning the application of foreign or international law has implications for judicial comity between states and
foreign nations. Legislation banning the application of foreign or
Sharia law would violate the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the U.S.
112
Constitution. This clause requires that “Full Faith and Credit shall
be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Pro113
ceedings of every other State.” Therefore, if a court in a state that
does not have this outright ban on the consideration of foreign or
Sharia law enforces an arbitration award that relied on foreign or
Sharia law, the parties in that arbitration may be at risk of not having
that judgment recognized in another state.
Although the Full Faith and Credit Clause does not apply to for114
eign judgments, the United States under a principle of comity en115
forces foreign judgments domestically. However, except where pre116
empted by federal law, enforcement of foreign judgments is left to
117
the discretion of state courts. Therefore, state legislation that bans
the consideration of foreign law would threaten this long-standing
111 Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111 (10th Cir. 2012) (upholding the district court’s preliminary
injunction preventing certification of State Question 755 “Save our State” Amendment to Oklahoma’s Constitution banning the application of international or Sharia law by the state’s courts).
112 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
113 Id.
114 Id. (“Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and
judicial Proceedings of every other State.”); Perrin v. Perrin, 408 F.2d 107, 109 (3d Cir. 1969) (the
recognition of a foreign decree is based on principles of comity, rather than full faith and credit).
115 See, e.g., Laskosky v. Laskosky, 504 So. 2d 726, 729 (Miss. 1987) (upholding Canadian
judgment in child custody case that involved a mother from Mississippi); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 98 (1988).
116 The United States is a signatory to the U.N. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (“New York Convention”), which has been in force since
June 7, 1959. The New York Convention requires members to domestically recognize foreign
arbitral awards. For the Convention’s text, see http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/uncitral_texts/
arbitration/NYConvention.html. In addition, the United States is signatory to the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, which requires members to recognize each other’s
judgments in cases between parties to an international commercial transaction. The Hague
Convention on Choice of Court Agreements was concluded on Jun. 30, 2005, but has not entered
into force as of Jan. 1 2012. For a list of signatories as of February 23, 2012, see
http://www.hcch.net/upload/statmtrx_e.pdf.
117 Laskosky, 504 So. 2d at 729.
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practice of judicial comity and make enforcement vulnerable for any
118
These and
United States judgment seeking recognition abroad.
other effects would be many of the unintended consequences of enacting blanket prohibitions on the application of foreign or international law.
B.

Domestic Application of Choice of Law

The anti-Sharia movement cites a sample of fifty appellate court
cases, claiming that judges in these cases deferred to Sharia law con119
trary to the United States Constitution and state public policy. A
look at some of those cases that involved either arbitration agreements or contracts, in keeping with this paper’s focus, will demonstrate
that the fear of Sharia infiltrating the United States’ justice system is
unfounded.
In Abd Alla v. Mourssi, the parties had agreed to Islamic arbitration in the event that a dispute arose involving their partnership
120
agreement. One of the parties filed a motion to vacate the Islamic
121
Arbitration Committee’s award. In addition to the fact that the defendant had failed to file a challenge within the time limitation, the
court found that absent “any fraud, corruption or other undue means,”
122
the court was required to enforce the award. The court simply applied “neutral principles” of contract law to enforce a valid agreement,
as it would do in any other arbitration agreement dispute regardless of
whether the parties had chosen secular or religious law to govern their
123
dispute.
124
Another case cited by proponents of anti-Sharia law is a case
involving a former Islamic minister who sued an Islamic center and its
members alleging defamation and other contractual claims, including
125
breach of contract. The court in that case found that because the
claims required the interpretation of Islamic law, the court lacked sub126
ject-matter jurisdiction to hear the dispute. Not able to apply neu-

118 See, e.g., Dispelling Sharia Threat, supra note 16; see also Republic of the Phil. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 43 F.3d 65, 75 (3d. Cir. 1995) (“But while it is true that principles of comity
cannot compel a domestic court to uphold foreign interests at the expense of the public policies
of the forum state, it can—and does—force courts in the United States to tailor their remedies
carefully to avoid undue interference with the domestic activities of other sovereign nations.”).
119 CENTER FOR SECURITY POLICY, supra note 16, at 8.
120 Abd Alla v. Mourssi, 680 N.W.2d 569, 570-71 (Minn Ct. App. 2004).
121 Id. at 571-72.
122 Id. at 573.
123 Id.
124 CENTER FOR SECURITY POLICY, supra note 16, at 36.
125 El-Farra v. Sayyed, 226 S.W.3d 792, 793 (Ark. 2006).
126 Id. at 795-96.
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tral principles of law to decide the issue in accordance the First
Amendment, the court affirmed the lower court’s decision that it did
127
not have subject-matter jurisdiction to decide the claim. Contrary to
the fact that it was cited among the top twenty cases to demonstrate
128
that Sharia law is “infiltrating” the United States legal system, this
case demonstrates that current domestic law and the application of
United States constitutional principles by domestic courts already
serve to protect our constitutional rights.
IV. EFFECT OF PROPOSED & ENACTED LEGISLATION
Oklahoma became the first state to enact a constitutional
129
amendment on this issue.
Voters in Oklahoma overwhelmingly
voted in support of a constitutional amendment that banned the con130
sideration of international law, expressly mentioning Sharia law.
131
Other states followed suit in proposing similar legislation.
However, most states in an attempt to avoid First Amendment issues
132
eliminated any specific reference to Sharia law. Proposed legislation
127

Id. at 796-97.
CENTER FOR SECURITY POLICY, supra note 16, at 10, 36.
129 Joel Siegel, Islamic Sharia Law to be Banned in, Ah, Oklahoma, ABC NEWS (Jun. 14,
2010),
http://abcnews.go.com/US/Media/oklahoma-pass-laws-prohibiting-islamic-sharia-lawsapply/story?id=10908521#.T15ZoMxYKKw.
130 James C. McKinley Jr., Oklahoma Surprise: Islam as an Election Issue, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 15, 2010, at A12.
131 In 2010, Oklahoma, Tennessee and Louisiana all passed legislation banning application
of international or foreign law. In 2011, Arizona passed H.B. 2064. The 2012 legislative session
has seen about 15 bills return from the 2011 legislative session, in addition to 18 new bills, making the total 33 bills in 20 states.
132 See, e.g., S.B. 33, 2012 Reg. Sess. (Ala. 2012) (const. amend.); S.B. 40, 2012 Reg. Sess. (Ala.
2012); S.B. 84, 2012 Reg. Sess. (Ala. 2012); H.B. 88, 27th Leg., 2012 Reg. Sess. (Alaska 2012) (carried from 2011 leg. sess.); H.B. 2064, 50th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2011) (approved on Apr. 12,
2011, effective Apr. 13, 2011) (codified at 2011 Ariz. Sess. Laws Ch. 22); H.B. 1209, 2012 Reg. Sess.
(Fla. 2012); S.B. 1360, 2012 Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2012); H.B. 45, 2011-2012 Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2011); H.B.
242 2011-2012 Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2012); S.B. 51 (Ga. 2012) (all carried over from 2011 leg. session);
H.B. 1166, 117th Gen. Assemb., 2012 Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2012); S.B. 36, 117th Gen. Assemb., 2012
Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2012); H.B. 489, 84th Gen. Assemb., 2011-2012 Reg. Sess. (Iowa 2011); H.B. 575,
84th Gen. Assemb., 2011-2012 Reg. Sess. (Iowa 2011); H.J.R. 14 , 84th Gen. Assemb., 2011-2012
Reg. Sess. (Iowa 2011) (all carried over from 2011 leg. sess.); H.B. 2087, 2012 Reg. Sess. (Kan.
2011) (carried over from 2011 leg. sess.); H.B. 4769, 2011-2012 Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2011) (carried
over from 2011 leg. sess.); S.B. 701, 2011-2012 Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2012); L.B. 647, 102nd Leg, 2011
Reg. Sess. (Neb. 2011) (carried over from 2011 leg. sess.); H.B. 1512, 96th Gen. Assemb., 2d. Reg.
Sess. (Mo. 2012); S.B. 676, 96th Gen. Assemb., 2nd. Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2012); H.B. 1422, 2012 Reg.
Sess. (N.H. 2012); S.J.R. 14, 2012 Reg. Sess. (N.M. 2012); H.B. 640, 2011-2012 Reg. Sess. (N.C.
2011) (carried over from 2011 leg. sess.); A919, 215th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2012); H.B. 1552, 50th
Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2011) (carried over from 2011 leg. sess.); H.B. 3490, 119th Gen. Assemb., 2011-2012 Reg. Sess. (S.C. 2011); S.B. 444, 119th Gen. Assemb., 2011-2012 Reg. Sess. (S.C.
2011) (all carried over from 2011 leg. sess.); H.B. 2029, 2012 Reg. Sess. (Penn. 2011) (carried over
from 2011 leg. sess.); H.B. 631, 2012 Reg. Sess. (Va. 2012); H.B. 3220, 80th Leg., 2012 Reg. Sess.
(W. Va. 2011) (carried over from 2011 leg. sess.).
128
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by other states provided for a blanket prohibition of any “foreign law,
133
legal code or system.” States preempting any constitutional attacks
on First Amendment grounds opted for the blanket ban with the aim
134
of preventing the use and application of Sharia law. This focus on
Sharia is ironic considering that many legislators were unable to cite
to a single decision where a court imposed Sharia law contrary to pub135
lic policy and in some instances could not even provide a definition
136
of Sharia law.
A. What is “foreign law”?
States purporting to ban the application of Sharia law through a
ban on foreign law must first look to whether Sharia law can be con137
sidered “foreign law” under the proposed and enacted legislation.
Louisiana, in its legislation, defined “foreign law” as any “law, rule, or
legal code of a jurisdiction outside of the states and territories of the
138
United States.” While other states specifically included religious law
139
as part of their definition of “foreign law.” However, those states
that enacted their proposed bills or constitutional amendments interestingly did not include religious law as part of their definition of
140
“foreign law.”
Textually, foreign law under that above definition captures any
law promulgated by a foreign sovereign, but it is less clear whether
141
that would include religious law. Sharia law, in particular, has influ142
enced the legal codes in most Muslim countries. It is based on the
133 See, e.g., H.B. 2064, 50th Leg., 1st. Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2011) (approved on Apr. 12, 2011,
effective Apr. 13, 2011) (codified at 2011 Ariz. Sess. Laws Ch. 22).
134 Bill Banning Sharia Law Meets Protests, Questions of Constitutionality, NEWS SERVICE
OF FLORIDA (Feb. 29, 2012), http://www.sunshineslate.com/2012/02/29/bill-sharia-law-protests.
135 Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111, 1129-30 (10th Cir. 2012) (in considering whether the State
of Oklahoma had asserted a compelling interest, the court found that the state did not identify
an actual problem based on the fact that “they did not know of even a single instance where an
Oklahoma court had applied Sharia law”).
136 Dispelling Sharia Threat, supra note 17.
137 Id. (discussing Missouri H.R. Hearing).
138 See S.B. 1274, 2012 Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2012); H.B. 785, 2010 Reg. Sess. (La. 2010). Similar
definitions also adopted by H.B. 3490, 119th Gen. Assemb., 2011-2012 Reg. Sess. (S.C. 2011); S.B.
308, 96th Gen. Assemb., 2011 Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2011); H.B. 525, 2011 Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2011); H.B.
4769, 2011 Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2011); L.D. 1076, 125th Leg., 2011 Reg. Sess. (Me. 2011); H.B. 2087,
2011 Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2011); H.F. 489, 84th Gen. Assemb., 2011 Reg. Sess. (Iowa 2011); H.B. 242,
2011-2012 Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2011); H.B. 45, 2011-2012 Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2011).
139 See e.g., H.F. 575, 84th Gen. Assemb., 2011-2012 Reg. Sess. (Iowa 2011); H.B. 301, 2011
Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2011).
140 See e.g., H.B. 785, 2010 Reg. Sess. (La. 2010) (codified at LA. REV. STAT. § 9:6000).
141 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009) (defines foreign law, generally as “the law of
another country”).
142 Toni Johnson, Islam: Governing Under Sharia, COUNSEL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
http://www.cfr.org/religion/islam-governing-under-sharia/p8034 (last updated Oct. 24, 2011).
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143

Qur’an and the teachings of the Prophet Mohammed. While in some
countries Sharia is the source of the law, in many other Muslim countries it operates as a separate legal system and is applied at the discre144
tion of the parties in certain familial and financial conflicts.
It is important to note that the Qur’an requires Muslims to be
loyal to their state of residence and that religion must not be a matter
145
of the state. Under this doctrine, Muslims living in the United States,
as a sign of their loyalty, would then necessarily be inclined to adhere
146
to the United States Constitution. This proposition has also been
supported by other United States experts on Sharia law who have
recognized that Sharia law, except for some fundamental tenets, is expected to change depending on time and place and will not be applied
147
if it goes against an individual or community’s public interest.
Sharia does not fit the formal definition of “foreign law” for the
148
following reasons: (1) it exists separate from a sovereign state; (2) it
is founded upon religions edicts, not on the democratic consensus of
individuals; (3) it provides moral guidance for individuals in areas beyond the normal boundaries of state law, providing duties rather than
149
rights to individuals; and (4) religious rules are usually not codified
and can vary between different religious communities observing the
150
same faith.
Critics have urged that it would be a mistake to consider Sharia
law as simply a religious code because it governs all behavior in the
151
secular sphere. However, Sharia, like Jewish law or Catholic Canon,
is imbedded in our society through an individual’s religious choice and
152
is not imposed on individuals by a foreign state or government. A
federal district court in Oklahoma interpreted Oklahoma’s recently

143

Id.
Id.
145 Qasim Rashid, Sharia Law: The Five Things Every Non-Muslim (and Muslim) Should
Know, HUFFINGTON POST/MUSLIM WRITERS GUILD OF AMERICA, (Nov. 4, 2011),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/qasim-rashid/shariah-law-the-five-things-every-nonmuslim_b_1068569.html.
146 Id.; see also Dispelling Sharia Threat, supra note 17.
147 Dispelling the Sharia Threat, supra note 17.
148 Sharia law is a religion, which therefore exists separate from the existence of state laws
and regulations. However, many states, such as Egypt, have based their laws on Sharia principles.
149 Sharia addresses personal matters such as sexual intercourse, hygiene, adultery, diet,
prayer and fasting.
150 See generally Dispelling Sharia Threat, supra note 17.
151 See Bill Gertz, Shariah a Danger to U.S., Security Pros Say, THE WASH. TIMES (Sept. 14,
2010), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/sep/14/shariah-a-danger-to-us-security-prossay/?page=all.
152 U.S. CONST. amend. I; see generally Dispelling Sharia Threat, supra note 17.
144
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enacted Constitutional amendment’s reference to Sharia law as a ref153
erence to religious beliefs rather than a legal system.
In light of the above definition of Sharia law, proposed and enacted state legislation creating blanket prohibitions on the application
of foreign law may be subject to a wide variety of interpretations by
the courts including one that may find that Sharia is not considered
“foreign law.” This would undermine the entire objective of some of
these “anti-Sharia” laws which cloaked themselves under otherwise
154
neutral and seemingly non-discriminatory language.
B.

Redundancy of Legislation

The application of foreign and international law has already been
limited by the requirement that it not contradict state and Federal
155
This has been the guiding principle in the United
constitutions.
States’ history of jurisprudence without the need for enacting an addi156
tional all-out ban on the application of foreign law. The law, prior to
the proposed legislation, already gave guidance to judges on exercising their discretion when applying foreign law by requiring the appli157
In essence,
cation to be consistent with constitutional principles.
effective mechanisms are already in place in the United States’ judicial system to prevent courts from impermissibly becoming entangled
in religion or considering a religious code as a basis for their deci158
sions.
159
The United States was founded on the adoption of foreign law.
For example, Florida declared the common law of England, prior to

153 Awad v. Ziriax, 754 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1303-04 (W. D. Okla. 2010) (court found that Oklahoma resident had proved substantial likelihood of success on the merits that amendment to the
Oklahoma Constitution to forbid state courts from considering or using international law or
Sharia law violated the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment ); See also, John R. Crook, Oklahoma Constitutional Amendment Barring Consideration of
Sharia and International Law Overwhelmingly Approved by Voters, Preliminarily Enjoined by
U.S. Court, 105 AM. J. INT’L L. 123 (2011).
154 Most legislation in order to appear neutral does not single out a prohibition against
Sharia, but rather prohibits the application of foreign law that would be against a State’s public
policy. See, e.g., H.B. 2064, 50th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2011)(approved on Apr. 12, 2011, effective Apr. 13, 2011) (codified at 2011 Ariz. Sess. Laws Ch. 22).
155 Dispelling Sharia Threat, supra note 17.
156 Id.
157 Omar Scaribery, Islamic Law Ban in State Court Petitioned by Muslims, HUFFINGTON
POST (Sept. 12, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/09/12/muslims-ban-islamiclaw_n_959104.html.
158 Dispelling Sharia Threat, supra note 17.
159 See, e.g., Ind. Code § 1-1-2-1 (2000) (Indiana’s reception statute: “the law governing this
state is declared to be …(4) The common law of England, and statutes of the British Parliament
made in aid thereof prior to the fourth year of reign of James the First…,and which are of general
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the Declaration of Independence, to be in force provided that it was
not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States
160
and the acts of Florida’s legislature.
The legislation being proposed is based upon an unfounded fear
that judges will disregard their constitutional duties and exercise their
discretion in favor of applying foreign law or, as the majority seems to
161
fear, Sharia law. While courts have applied foreign law, the application has occurred with the limitation that it not be inconsistent with
162
domestic laws and state and federal constitutions.
Contrary to what critics cite as a justification for the enactment of
163
anti-Sharia type legislation, Sharia law is not infiltrating our judicial
164
system. In fact, Oklahoma, the first to enact such anti-Sharia legislation, admitted to not having any evidence that Sharia law is being im165
posed by their state courts.
As far as religion is concerned, the First Amendment already limits the role that courts may undertake when resolving disputes involv166
ing religious doctrine or practice. However, the First Amendment
does not prevent the resolution of religious disputes so long as the
167
In other
court bases its decision on “neutral principles of law.”
words, the court cannot perform an “inquiry into religious doctrine,”
but rather has to base its decision on secular principles such as con-

nature, not local to that kingdom, and not inconsistent with the first, second, and third specifications of this section”).
160 Fla. Stat. § 2.01 (2011).
161 Dispelling Sharia Threat, supra note 17 (every judge takes an oath to uphold the laws of
the State/United State and the U.S. Constitution).
162 Chamara v. Yatim, 937 N.E.2d 490, 495 (Mass. App. Ct. 2010) (no deference was due to
the custody order issued by a Jaafarite religious tribunal (Jaafarite Court) in Lebanon because
the custody order was not made in “substantial conformity” with Massachusetts law); Amin v.
Bakhaty, 798 So. 2d 75, 86 (La. 2001) (refusing to enforce Egyptian court order granting custody
to father since that order was not based on “best interests of the child” and therefore against
Louisiana’s public policy); see generally ACLU Report, Nothing to Fear, supra note 80.
163 See generally CENTER FOR SECURITY POLICY, supra note 16.
164 ACLU Report, Nothing to Fear, supra note 80 at 1.
165 Dispelling Sharia Threat, supra note 17; see also Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111, 1130 (10th
Cir. 2012).
166 U.S. CONST. amend. I, cl. 1 (“Congress shall make no law respecting the establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof…
”); see also Presbyterian Church in U.S. v. Mary
Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1968) (holding that “restraints of
First Amendment, as applied to states through Fourteenth Amendment, forbid a civil court from
awarding church property on basis of interpretation and significance the civil court assigns to
aspects of church doctrine”).
167 Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602-03 (1979) (establishing that the “neutral principles approach” prevents courts from entanglement with religious doctrine while granting flexibility to
resolve the dispute).
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168

tractual rights. States have recognized this doctrine in domestic arbi169
tration cases.
In Avitzur v. Avitzur, a Jewish couple signed a “Ketubah” with an
agreement that recognized the Beth Din, a rabbinical tribunal, as hav170
ing authority over their marriage. Although the husband had obtained a divorce through a civil court, the wife was not considered divorced until she obtained a Jewish divorce or “Get” in accordance
171
with their marital agreement. The court in Avitzur found that the
First Amendment did not prevent it from enforcing the couples’ mar172
riage agreement, which required them to go before the Beth Din. A
“neutral principles of law” approach allowed the court to enforce the
secular portions of the Ketubah, which required the enforcement of
173
the husband’s promise to refer any marital disputes to the Beth Din.
The court reinforced the Supreme Court’s precedent when it stated
that “to the extent that an enforceable promise can be found by the
application of neutral principles of contract law,” the court may re174
solve the dispute without interfering with religious practice or law.
Similar protections against enforcing any contract or law that
would be against public policy also exist in the world of international
arbitration. The United Nations Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards of 1958 (the "New York Convention”) is the main instrument governing the enforcement of com175
mercial international arbitration agreements and awards.
Under the New York Convention, state signatories would enforce
an international award arising from another party-state to the Con176
vention. The United States ratified the New York Convention and
thus is bound to domestically recognize foreign arbitration awards
177
from other party-states. Federal courts, in addition to state courts,
178
have jurisdiction to enforce arbitral awards. The Convention already
168

Id.
See, e.g., Avitzur v. Avitzur, 446 N.E.2d 136, 137 (N.Y. 1983) (deciding whether the court
had a proper role in deciding the enforceability of a Ketubah, an agreement entered into as part
of a Jewish marriage).
170 Id.
171 Id.
172 Id. at 138-39.
173 Id. at 139.
174 Id.
175 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, U.N.
CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, Jun. 10, 1958, available at
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/NY-conv/XXII_1_e.pdf. [hereinafter N.Y.
Convention].
176 Id. at art. 1.
177 United States ratified the N.Y. Convention in Sept. 30, 1970.
178 9 U.S.C.A. § 205 (2012); see also Fiske, Emery & Ass’n v. Ajello, 577 A. 2d 1139 (Conn.
Super Ct. 1989).
169
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allows a state signatory to refuse recognition of the award if it is con179
State legislation
trary to the enforcing state’s own public policy.
purporting to limit the application of foreign law to recognize a foreign arbitration award would be preempted by this Convention under
180
the Supremacy Clause.
C.

Separation of Powers

The language utilized in some of the proposed legislation threatens to violate the separation of powers doctrine. Restricting the judiciary from considering foreign law may infringe upon the judiciary’s
181
ability to be the sole interpreter of the nation’s laws. This would be
exemplified where a court is facing the enforcement of a foreign
judgment, arbitral award, or a choice-of-law clause in a private con182
tract between parties.
It has long been recognized by many state courts that the legislature is not permitted to restrict, encroach, or infringe the inherent
183
powers of the judicial body. Interpretation of a statute, choice-of-law
clause, or foreign arbitral award is within the inherent powers of the
judiciary, which may require the interpretation and application of for184
eign law. The question is whether the proposed legislation unduly
185
impairs
an
exercise
of
inherent
judicial
powers.
One of the inherent powers recognized is the “power to take actions
reasonably necessary to administer justice efficiently, fairly, and eco-

179 N.Y. Convention, supra note 175 at art. V. (2)(b) (Recognition and enforcement of an
arbitral award may also be refused if the competent authority in the country where recognition
and enforcement is sought find that (b) the recognition or enforcement of the award would be
contrary to the public policy of that country).
180 See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 2 (1984) (“[I]n enacting § 2 of the Federal
Act, Congress declared a national policy favoring arbitration and withdrew the power of the
states to require a judicial forum for the resolution of claims which the contracting parties
agreed to resolve by arbitration”).
181 Cf. Florida Senate Bill Analysis and Fiscal Impact Statement, Feb 29, 2012, available at
http://www.flsenate.gov/Session/Bill/2012/1360.
182 See, e.g.,Mansour v. Islamic Educ. Ctr. of Tampa, No. 08-CA-3497 (Fla. 13th Cir. Ct. Mar.
22, 2011).
183 Schoenvogel ex rel. Schoenvogel v. Venator Grp. Retail, Inc., 895 So. 2d 225 (Ala. 2004);
Kerns v. CSE Ins. Grp., 106 Cal. App. 4th 368, 130 Cal. Rptr. 2d 754 (1st Dist. 2003); State v.
McCahill, 261 Conn. 492, 811 A.2d 667 (2002); Adair Architects, Inc. v. Bruggeman, 346 Ill. App.
3d 523, 281 Ill. Dec. 938, 805 N.E. 2d 306 (3d Dist. 2004); Hoag v. State, 889 So. 2d 1019 (La. 2004);
Querubin v. Com., 440 Mass. 108, 795 N.E. 2d 534 (2003); Spitznas v. State, 1982 OK CR 115, 648
P.2d 1271 (Okla. Crim. App. 1982); DeMendoza v. Huffman, 334 Or. 425, 51 P.3d 1232 (2002);
State v. Holmes, 106 Wis. 2d 31, 315 N.W. 2d 703 (1982).
184 See generally Parasharami, supra note 110 (discussing the Supreme Court’s interpretation of choice-of-law clauses).
185 Ex parte Dozier, 262 Ala. 197, 199, 77 So. 2d 903, 905 (1953).
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186

nomically.” Legislation that bans courts from considering interna187
tional, Sharia, or foreign law would infringe upon this power.
In Iowa, the proposed bill includes limiting the sources that
188
judges could utilize for interpreting the Constitution, which is con189
trary to Supreme Court precedent in Lawrence v. Texas, Roper v.
190
191
192
Simmons, Thompson v. Oklahoma, and Graham v. Florida, all of
which considered foreign and international norms in reaching their
193
decisions. In the most recent case of Graham v. Florida, the Court
reflected on its consideration of foreign law, by stating that it has
treated the laws and practices of other nations and international
agreements as relevant to the Eighth Amendment not because those
norms are binding or controlling but because the judgment of the
world’s nations that a particular sentencing practice is inconsistent
with basic principles of decency demonstrates that the Court’s ration194
ale has respected reasoning to support it.
While it must be acknowledged that members of the Supreme
Court are often at odds with each other over whether international
195
law can serve as a judicial source for interpretation, it must also be
recognized that these “anti-Sharia” laws would prevent not only international and foreign source reference but would also prevent en196
forcement of validly entered contracts and arbitration awards.

186

See, e.g., Matter of Dunleavy, 769 P.2d 1271, 1272 (Nev. 1988).
See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577 (2003) (The court looked to international
human rights standards and other countries treatment of the issue in reaching a decision that
“[t]he right the petitioners seek in this case has been accepted as an integral part of human
freedom in many other countries. There has been no showing that in this country the governmental interest in circumscribing personal choice is somehow more legitimate or urgent.”).
188 H. J.R. 14, 84th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Iowa 2011) (constitutional amendment prohibiting the courts of this state from using international law when exercising judicial power) (legislation was carried over from 2011 session).
189 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
190 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (holding that the death penalty should not be
applicable if the offense was committed when the individual was under the age of eighteen).
191 Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 868 (1988).
192 Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010) (court acknowledged law of foreign nations in
support of its finding that a particular punishment is cruel and unusual in violation of the Eight
Amendment).
193 See, e.g., Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2033; Lawrence, 439 U.S. at 598; Roper, 543 U.S. at 554;
Thompson, 487 U.S. at 868.
194 Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2033.
195 See Transcript of Constitutional Relevance of Foreign Court Decisions, Scalia-Breyer
Debate, presented by U.S. Association of Constitutional Law, at American University, Jan. 13,
2005, transcript available at http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/news/1352357/posts (last visited
Jan 28, 2012).
196 Dispelling Sharia Threat, supra note 17.
187
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D. Contrary to Existing Laws and U.S. Policy
Some of the states proposing anti-Sharia laws have failed to notice how this legislation will interact with other legislation already in
197
place. Take for instance, Missouri, which proposed a ban on state
198
court’s consideration of foreign law, including Sharia law. The Missouri Constitution contains a prohibition against enacting any law that
199
would impair a contract. The Constitution specifically states, “[t]hat
no ex post facto law, nor law impairing the obligation of contracts, or
retrospective in its operation, or making any irrevocable grant of spe200
cial privileges or immunities, can be enacted.” However, legislation
banning the application or use of foreign law will do just that to par201
ties who voluntarily enter into contracts that apply foreign law.
Legislation that seeks to ban the interpretation and/or application of foreign law also undermines our history of international com202
ity. Comity in the United States “has served as a principle of defer203
ence to foreign law and foreign courts.” While comity is not without
its limitations, it has given courts discretion to enforce foreign judgments. Treaties now regulate much of comity where countries have
agreed to recognize each other judgments in cases of international
204
arbitration and commercial contract disputes.
In fact, courts now
justify their application of comity out of deference of party autonomy,
205
demonstrating a shift in the view of international comity. This shift
has signaled a view that comity is exercised less out of judicial discre206
tion and more out of legal obligation. The Supreme Court has recognized the importance of protecting the autonomy of private parties
by finding that concerns of international comity, respect for the capacities of foreign and transnational tribunals, and sensitivity to the
need of the international commercial system for predictability in the
resolution of disputes require enforcement of the parties’ agreement,

197
198

Id.
H.B. 708, 96th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2011) (passed by House, died on Senate

floor).
199

MO. CONST. art. I, § 13 (2011).
Id.
201 Dispelling Sharia Threat, supra note 17.
202 Id.
203 Joel R. Paul, The Transformation of International Comity, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
19, 20 (2008); see generally Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895).
204 See, e.g., N.Y. Convention, supra note 175. But cf., Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64
(1895) (recognizing a divorce decree issued in a foreign country on the basis of comity).
205 Paul, supra note 203, at 20, 27.
206 Id. at 29-30.
200
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even assuming that a contrary result would be forthcoming in a do207
mestic context.
While the principle of comity is not obligatory on a court, new
legislation either prohibiting the consideration of foreign law or requiring the foreign law to adhere to our constitutional standards will
likely decrease judicial economy and make judges more hesitant in
granting comity to foreign judgments.
E.

A Look at Bills Signed into Law
1. Oklahoma’s Constitutional Amendment

Out of those states that have enacted legislation in this area,
208
Oklahoma is unique in that it specifically singled out Sharia law.
Although there has not been a single case in which Sharia law has
209
been applied, legislators characterize the law as a necessary “pre210
emptive” strike.
The constitutional amendment has yet to be certified to the
Oklahoma Supreme Court due to a pending constitutional challenge
on the grounds that it violates the Establishment Clause of the United
211
States Constitution. The Tenth Circuit recently affirmed the U.S.
District Court’s decision to issue an injunction finding that the constitutional amendment, forbidding courts from considering Sharia or
international law, violated the First Amendment’s Establishment and
212
Free Exercise Clause.
On the merits of the issue, the plaintiff in this case have put forth
arguments that this amendment is tantamount to the government disapproving of his religion because it specifically singles out Sharia

207 Id. at 30 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614,
629 (1985).
208 See generally, Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111 ( 10th Cir. 2012). Only one other state has
specifically singled out Sharia, but the bill died in committee. See H.B. 698, 106th Gen. Assemb.,
2012 Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2012) (the bill defined “foreign law” as including Sharia law).
209 Steve Benen, Oklahoma Bar Imaginary Sharia Threat, WASHINGTON MONTHLY (Nov. 3,
2010), http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/archives/individual/2010_11/026460.php.
210 Stephen Clark, Group Launches Media Blitz in Oklahoma for Anti-Shariah Ballot Initiative, FOX NEWS (Oct 20, 2010), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2010/10/20/anti-islamic-grouplaunches-media-blitz-oklahoma-anti-shariah-ballot-initiative/.
211 The Associated Press, Oklahoma: New Amendment Is Delayed, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2010,
at A21 (Okla. State Bd. of Elections is appealing decision by federal district judge in the W.D. of
Oklahoma in Awad v. Ziriax to the 10th Cir. Ct. of Appeals.); See also OK Election Board Seeks
to Appeal Shariah Law Ruling (Nov. 30, 2010), http://politics.blogs.foxnews.com/2010/11/30/okelection-board-seeks-appeal-shariah-law-ruling.
212 Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111 (10th Cir. 2012).
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213

law. The Amendment is not neutral on its face, as it expressly pro214
hibits the consideration of Sharia law. It also fails to define Sharia
law, leaving room for ambiguity in the application and interpretation
215
of this constitutional amendment.
The Tenth Circuit found that Oklahoma’s constitutional amendment discriminated against religions despite appellant’s argument that
216
the amendment banned all religious laws from Oklahoma courts.
The court in this case focused on the fact that by its plain language,
217
the amendment singled out Sharia law twice in its text. In the end,
the Tenth Circuit reiterated its position that “while the public has an
interest in the will of the voter[s] being carried out…the public has a
more profound and long-term interest in upholding an individual’s
218
constitutional rights.”
Besides banning the application of Sharia law, Oklahoma’s constitutional amendment also enjoins the consideration of international
219
law. This provision in the amendment appears to violate Article VI
220
of the U.S. Constitution. Treaties signed by the United States consti221
tute binding international law on all fifty states of the United States.
Unlike other proposed legislation, Oklahoma does not explicitly ex222
clude treaties signed by the United States. According to the current
language of the Oklahoma constitutional amendment, a court could
interpret it to prevent the application of an international treaty, in
223
violation of the Supremacy Clause.
There is also the issue of international customary law. While it
has not been incorporated into federal law, the Supreme Court has
declared certain international customary law norms which are sufficiently well defined and accepted by a wide majority of nation states,

213 Crook, supra note 153; Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 828 (2000) (“courts should refrain
from trolling through a person’s or institution’s religious beliefs”).
214 H.J.R. 1056, 52d Leg., 2d Sess. (Okla. 2010) (Okla. “Save Our State” Const. Amend.,
amending art. 7, §1).
215 Id.
216 Awad, 670 F.3d at 1128.
217 Id.
218 Id. at 1132 (quoting G & V Lounge, Inc. v. Mich. Liquor Control Comm’n, 23 F.3d 1071,
1079 (6th Cir. 1994)).
219 H.J.R. 1056, 52d Leg., 2d Sess. (Okla. 2010) (Okla. “Save Our State” Const. Amend.,
amending art. 7, §1) (“The courts shall not look to the legal precepts of other nations or cultures.
Specifically, the courts shall not consider international law or Sharia law.”).
220 U.S. CONST. art. VI (“All treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of
the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land.”).
221 U.S. CONST. art. VI.
222 H.J.R. 1056, 52d Leg., 2d Sess. (Okla. 2010) (Okla. “Save Our State” Const. Amend.,
codified in OKLA. CONST., art. 7, § 1(c)).
223 See id.
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224

as part of federal law. This legislation would prohibit any court from
enforcing any international customary norms already recognized by
225
the United States and enforceable as Supreme Court precedent. It
would also likely restrict the judiciary from looking at sources of
226
American law that are based on international norms.
It is also unclear whether the legislative intent in banning the application of international law was also aimed at precluding the use of
227
foreign law. Foreign law, as previously discussed in part A of this
228
section, is not international law.
Finally, there is also a question of how this amendment would affect the enforcement of treaties with Oklahoma’s Native American
229
population. This is particularly pertinent in Oklahoma, which has
the second highest Native American population in the United States
230
according to the 2010 Census.
Oklahoma legislation, along with
other states’ anti-Sharia legislation, could prevent courts from consid231
ering the law of a tribal nation in interpreting treaties since this law
232
lives in a separate realm to any state law.
The language of Oklahoma’s constitutional amendment demonstrates a lack of understanding of the interplay between international
and domestic law because it ignores any pre-emption by federal and
constitutional law, and fails to consider the unintended consequences
of enacting this type of legislation into law.
224

See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 729 (2004).
Id.
226 This would include the application or interpretation of an international treaty by a court
in Oklahoma.
227 2010 Okla. H.J.R. 1056, codified in OKLA. CONST., art. 7 § 1(c) (language of the constitutional amendment does not make reference to foreign law, only explicitly singles out international and sharia law).
228 See, e.g., Frederic L. Kirgis, Is Foreign Law International Law?, ASILINSIGHTS (Oct. 31,
2005), http://www.asil.org/insights051031.cfm (foreign law is not necessarily international law; the
former is defined as the law that is promulgated by an “individual foreign country or, in some
instances, of an identifiable group of foreign countries that have a common legal system or a
common set of rules in a particular field of law,” and the latter “is the law in force between or
among nation-states that have expressly or tacitly consented to be bound by it.”).
229 Dispelling Sharia Threat, supra note 17.
230 Karen R. Humes, Nicholas A. Jones, Roberto R. Ramirez, Race Alone or in Combination
and Hispanic or Latino: 2010, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, Mar. 2011, available at
www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-02.pdf.
231 See generally Gale Courey Toensing, Campaign Against Sharia Law a Threat to Indian
Country,
INDIAN
COUNTRY
TODAY
MEDIA
NETWORK
(Sept.
6,
2011),
http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/2011/09/06/the-racists-are-coming-campaignagainst-sharia-law-a-threat-to-indian-country-49166; But cf., S.B. 1360, 2012 Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2012)
(Florida has excluded Native American Law from the definition of foreign law).
232 Native American Gaming,NAT’L GAMBLING IMPACT STUDY COMMISSION, available at
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/ngisc/research/nagaming.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2012) (recognizing that state and local laws do not apply within the territory occupied by Native American
tribes, even though that territory or reservation is under the protection of federal government).
225
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2. South Dakota House Bill 1253
South Dakota, unlike many of the other states, enacted a blanket
233
prohibition of the judicial enforcement of any religious codes. The
language of the statute reads, “no court, administrative agency, or
other governmental agency may enforce provisions of any religious
234
code.” The text was amended from, “[n]o court, arbitrator, administrative agency, or other adjudicative mediation or enforcement au235
thority may render any judgment predicated on any religious code.”
The language of the amendment would suggest that the legislature
was confining the application of the statute to courts or government
agencies, excluding the application of this statute to private domestic
236
and commercial arbitrations. However, the statute would still affect
arbitration. If a party seeks to enforce an arbitral award in a court
that is based upon Sharia, Jewish, Cannon, or other religious law, the
enforcing court would be prevented, according to the language of this
237
statute, from enforcing that award. For example, the South Dakota
legislation would prevent a judge in that state from enforcing an
agreement to arbitrate if the parties had contractually agreed to have
their dispute decided under a religious code or law, under similar cir238
cumstances as the facts in Mansour.
F.

Effects On Arbitration

Arbitration prides itself on efficiency, flexibility, lower costs, neu239
trality, privacy, and transparency. Parties exercise their freedom by
voluntarily entering into contracts with binding arbitration agree240
ments because of the advantages that arbitration offers. Legislation
curtailing the enforceability of arbitration awards based on foreign,
international, or religious code threatens to undermine the aforemen-

233

H.B. 1253, 87th Leg., Reg. Sess. (S.D. 2012) (signed into law Mar. 12, 2012).
Id.
235 Id.
236 Id.
237 The South Dakota bill explicitly prevents courts from enforcing any arbitration award
that might have relied on religious precepts, which quite often occurs in divorce arbitration
proceedings. It also would prevent anyone from getting their will probated if the will was based
on a religious faith.
238 In Mansour, the judge upheld the arbitration award that was based on Sharia law because applying contract law principles that was the choice-of-law that the parties had contractually agreed on.
239 Joanne K. Lelewer, International Commercial Arbitration as a Model for Resolving
Treaty Disputes, 21 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 379, 389 (1989).
240 Buys, supra note 94 at 59 (citing JULIAN D.M. LEW, APPLICABLE LAW IN
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 69 (1978)).
234
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241

For example, a party enforcing an arbitration
tioned advantages.
agreement may have to defend itself against a challenge from the
other party arguing that the foreign choice of law contravened the
242
forum state’s policy. This would increase the time and costs of the
dispute resolution and would likely require a collateral proceeding in
court to make the constitutional determination before continuing the
243
arbitration proceedings.
Both domestic and international arbitration provide a consensual
means to resolve a dispute by a non-governmental decision maker,
244
which in turn produces an enforceable and binding ruling. Being
able to receive an enforceable and binding ruling is one of the most
245
important aspects of arbitration.
In arbitration, federal and state courts have adopted a strong policy towards arbitration, staying any litigation pending arbitration.
Under the Federal Arbitration Act, “any doubts concerning the scope
of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration whether
the problem at hand is the construction of the contract language or an
246
allegation of waiver, delay, or a similar defense to arbitrability.” Arbitration clauses serve to ensure that procedurally, parties adhere to
the requirement to resolve the dispute in arbitration rather than in a
247
judicial forum.
If legislation banning the application of foreign, Sharia, or international law is enacted, the effect would be to severely constrain the
effectiveness of arbitration by increasing the unpredictability and en248
forceability of arbitration awards based on foreign law. Some statutes attempt to restrict the ability of arbitrators to consider foreign
249
law in the arbitration of the issues, undermining the neutrality of a
non-government decision maker charged with deciding the issue in
241

Dispelling Sharia Threat, supra note 17.
See, e.g., Mansour v. Islamic Educ. Ctr. of Tampa, Inc., No. 08-CA-3497 (Fla. 13thCir. Ct.
Mar. 22, 2011).
243 The constitutionality of a foreign law might be considered to be outside the scope of the
arbitration agreement because it deals with sensitive matters that deal with the public policy of a
state. See Yves Fortier, Arbitrability of Disputes, GLOBAL REFLECTIONS ON INTERNATIONAL
LAW, COMMERCIAL AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION 269, 276 (Gerald Aksen, et al eds., 2005) (state
courts, in particular, are required to draw a line between arbitrable and non-arbitrable issues
disputes. One of the basis to be considered is whether the issue deals with the state’s public
policy).
244 GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, COMMENTARY AND
MATERIALS 1-3 (2nd ed. 2001).
245 Id.
246 Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983).
247 See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985).
248 See, e.g., Dispelling Sharia Threat, supra note 17.
249 See, e.g., S.R. 926, 2011-2012 Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2012); H.B. 3220, 2011 Reg. Sess (W.V. 2011);
S.B. 33, 2012 Reg. Sess. (Ala.2012).
242
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250

arbitration. Under the Arizona bill, an arbitrator would be forced to
first consider the constitutionality of the foreign law before proceed251
ing in the application thereof.
Choice-of-law clauses are extremely important in international
252
commercial arbitration settings. These clauses allow parties from
different countries to contract with flexibility, transparency, and pre253
dictability. They also allow parties to select a neutral and established
system of law, preventing one or the other party from being subjected
to a law that may favor one party over the other based on national254
ity. In a survey conducted in 2010, fifty-eight% of those surveyed
found that their choice of law was mostly guided by their familiarity
255
and experience with the law chosen. Although this survey was conducted with parties involved in international transactions, this finding
might help explain why, in domestic settings, parties from the same
religious faith may choose to be governed by religious law rather than
secular rules, especially in cases where the parties are from different
states.
Arbitrators have broad powers to determine the applicability of a
256
choice-of-law clause. If no particular law is chosen by the parties,
arbitrators have the power to determine which set of conflict of law
257
rules should apply. There have also been increasing cases where the
250 See. e.g. H.B. 2064, 50th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2011) (approved on Apr. 12, 2011,
effective Apr. 13, 2011) (codified at 2011 Ariz. Sess. Laws Ch. 22).
251 H.B. 2064, 50th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2011) (approved on Apr. 12, 2011, effective
Apr. 13, 2011) (codified at 2011 Ariz. Sess. Laws Ch. 22)(art. 1 (b)) (“A court, arbitrator, administrative agency, or other adjudicative mediation or enforcement authority shall not enforce a
foreign law if doing so would violate a right guaranteed by the Constitution of this state or of the
United States or Conflict of Laws of the United States or of this state”).
252 Choice-of-law clauses provide predictability in the resolution of disputes because the
parties can agree to the law that will govern their contract. They also lower transaction costs
because they allow parties the ability to access the risks that they will undertake when entering
into an agreement with a foreign party and reducing those risks by avoiding the application of a
law that may treat the non-foreign party more favorably.
253 See generally Buys, supra note 94.
254 One of the benefits of arbitration is being able to select a neutral forum or law so that
neither party is given home-court advance by litigating the dispute in either their own law or
forum. See also 2010 International Arbitration Survey: Choices in International Arbitration,
WHITE & CASE, 11, Oct. 6, 2010, available at http://www.whitecase.com/files/upload/file
Repository/2010-International-Arbitration-Survey-Choices-International-Arbitration.PDF (finding
that when parties choose the law that will govern their contract they are mostly guided by the
law that is perceived as neutral and impartial with regards to the parties and their contract).
255 2010 International Arbitration Survey, supra note 254, at 12.
256 See, e.g., UNICITRAL Model Law Art. 28(1), (1995, amended 2006) available at
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/ml-arb/07-86998_Ebook.pdf (“The arbitral
tribunal shall decide the dispute in accordance with such rules of law as are chosen by the parties
as applicable to the substance of the dispute”).
257 See, e.g., ICC Rules, Art. 21(1) (Jan. 1, 1998), http://www.iccwbo.org/Products-andServices/Arbitration-and-ADR/Arbitration/ICC-Rules-of-Arbitration/#article_21 (“In the ab-
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arbitrators have evoked international standards or international laws
258
to reinforce the interpretation they have given to the applicable law.
States with legislation such as the one proposed in Oklahoma, banning
the application of international law, would have detrimental effects on
the enforceability of awards issued by arbitral tribunals relying on
international standards or laws.
G. Unintended Consequences
1. Implications on Domestic Transactions
Blanket prohibitions on foreign or international law have the
power to significantly interfere with a party’s right to choose arbitra259
tion as a means to resolve commercial or domestic relations matters.
In the domestic arena, many individuals carry out their private domes260
tic affairs under the direction of their respective religious faiths. Take
for example, United States’ citizens who are married abroad or are
divorced in another country, under some of these proposed laws, the
court would be barred from recognizing their marriage because it
261
would be an application or enforcement of a foreign or religious law.
Another issue is the recognition of an individual’s will which may require distribution of property in accordance with his religious faith. A
court, under this type of legislation, would be prevented from probat262
ing such a will under some of the proposed statutes. This would
263
override the principle of comity as previously discussed above.

sence of any such agreement, the Arbitral Tribunal shall apply the rules of law which it determines to be appropriate”); UNCITRAL Rules Art. 28(2) (“Failing such a designation by the
parties, the arbitral tribunal shall apply the law determined by the conflict of laws rules which it
considers applicable.”).
258 W. Laurence Craig, Symposium: Arbitration and National Courts: Conflict and Cooperation: The Arbitrator’s Mission and the Application of Law in International Commercial Arbitration, 21 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 243, 260 (2010).
259 The uncertainty of whether the law agreed upon by the parties will be enforced will
likely dissuade many from utilizing arbitration to resolve commercial and domestic issues,
thereby interfering with their individual rights to contract freely or practice religion without
interference from the state.
260 See, e.g., Brittany Alana Davis, ‘“anti-sharia”’ Bill Banning Foreign Law Passes House
Over Protests, MIAMI HERALD (Mar. 1, 2012), http://www.miamiherald.com/2012/03/
01/2670398/”anti-sharia”-bill-banning-foreign.html (citing public opposition to the bill because it
would invalidate marriages or divorces based no only on Sharia but also based on the Orthodox
Jewish faith).
261 Dispelling Sharia Threat, supra note 17.
262 See, e.g., H.B. 1253, 87th Leg., Reg. Sess. (S.D. 2012) (signed into law Mar. 12, 2012).
263 See infra § III.
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2. Implications on International Business Transactions
In the last decade, business transactions have become increasingly globalized, increasing the number of American businesses engag264
ing in international transactions. It would be impossible for this expansion to occur if trade and commerce were to be effectuated only
265
on terms governed by federal and state laws. International arbitra266
tion has been strongly preferred by corporate entities over litigation.
In fact, “hardly any international contract of commercial, financial
importance today is concluded without resort to an arbitration
267
clause.”
The United States remains an attractive seat for international arbitration for those seeking to settle their disputes via arbitration. The
American Arbitration Association (“AAA”) has been reported as the
268
institution most frequently used for international arbitration. The
main benefit of arbitration on the international level is the “desire to
avoid the risk of litigating in the adversary’s national courts and to
269
profit from the neutrality of an international arbitration forum.”
However, proposed and enacted legislation banning the use or consideration of foreign law would strip arbitration awards granted and enforced in the United States from possessing this neutrality.
International commerce and trade relies on the ability of parties
to freely negotiate and enter into agreements with parties from other
nation states, and in allowing this, states benefit from the inherent
270
benefits of free commerce. The application of foreign law is conducted for reasons of self-interest, where states want to ensure good
271
commercial and diplomatic relationships with other states.
Two recent cases reinforce the United States’ position as a lead272
ing forum for international arbitration proceedings. However, pro264 U.S. International Transactions, 1960-present, International Economic Accounts, U.S.
DEP’T OF COMMERCE BUREAU OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, available at http://www.bea.
gov/international/ (last visited Mar. 9, 2012).
265 Calleros, supra note 85, at 657.
266 International
Arbitration:
Corporate
Attitudes
and
Practices
2008,
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS [hereinafter 2008 Report], available at http://www.pwc.co.uk/
forensic-services/publications/international-arbitration-2008.jhtml.
267 W. Laurence Craig, Arbitration and National Courts: Conflict and Cooperation: The
Arbitrator’s Mission and the Application of Law in International Commercial Arbitration, 21 AM.
REV. INT’L ARB. 243, 251 (2010).
268 2008 Report, supra note 266.
269 Craig, supra note 267, at 258.
270 Paul, supra note 203, at 30 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth,
Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 629 (1985)).
271 Lehmann, supra note 101, at 403-405.
272 Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. Animalfeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010); Rent-A-Center,
West, Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772 (2010).
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posed anti-Sharia type legislation, in addition to pending federal legis273
lation, threatens to diminish the United States as an attractive forum
for arbitration.
274
In Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. Animalfeeds Int’l Corp, the Supreme
Court reinforced the consensual nature of arbitration and reversed
the AAA arbitration award because the parties had not anticipated or
275
contemplated class arbitration in their arbitration agreement. Another important case reinforcing the friendly attitude the United
276
States has towards arbitration is Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson.
In Rent-A-Center, the Court underscored the severability of arbitration clauses, leaving the question of the validity of the contract con277
taining the arbitration clauses to the arbitration panel.
Legislation in states banning the application or consideration of
foreign law threatens to make the United States a hostile place for
278
arbitration.
Although many of the bills limit the applicability of
279
their laws to natural persons but exclude application to corporations,
partnerships, or other business associations, there are still implications
280
to business transactions. For example, various states do not treat
partnerships as separate juridical entities; rather, they are seen as a
281
group of individuals tied under a partnership agreement. Thus, the
issue becomes a definitional one. When is an entity considered a business association? What occurs when the dispute is between a group of
individuals and a corporation? The same concern would arise when a
sole proprietor in the United States enters into a contract with a foreign company whose arbitration agreement applies international or
the foreign state’s law. If that sole proprietor gets a favorable arbitra-

273 H.R. 1020 Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009 (Declares that no predispute arbitration
agreement shall be valid or enforceable if it requires arbitration of: (1) an employment, consumer, or franchise dispute, or (2) a dispute arising under any statute intended to protect civil
rights).
274 Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. Animalfeeds Int’l Corp, 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010).
275 Id. at 1775.
276 Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772 (2010).
277 Id. at 2778.
278 “Anti-Sharia” legislation creates unpredictability on the enforcement of choice-of-law
clauses, necessarily making parties to international transactions wary of enforcing contractual
provisions in the United States.
279 See, e.g., S.B. 1294, 2012 Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2012); HB 2064, 50th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz.
2011) (approved on Apr. 12, 2011, effective Apr. 13, 2011) (codified at 2011 Ariz. Sess. Laws Ch.
22).
280 Dispelling Sharia Threat, supra note 17.
281 See, e.g., Allgeier, Martin & Assocs. v. Ashmore, 508 S.W. 2d 524, 525 (Mo. Ct. App.1974)
(Missouri court recognized that under the laws of the state, a partnership is not recognized as a
separate or juristic entity); In re Prestige Ltd. P’ship v. E Bay Car Wash Partners, 205 B.R. 427,
433 (9th Cir. 1997) (Finding that a partnership is not a separate legal entity under California
law).
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tion award based on foreign law, that individual may face a constitutional challenge from the other non-U.S. party arguing that the foreign
law goes against the forum state’s public policy.
Additionally, parties to an arbitration agreement with a foreign
choice-of-law clause will be disadvantaged if their respective home
state adopts restrictive legislation. For example, they will be required
to spend more money and perhaps even hire foreign law experts to
certify that the foreign law applied in the arbitration did not contravene the United States Constitution or any of that particular state’s
laws or public policy. Otherwise, they might find themselves with an
award that they may not be able to enforce. This will be particularly
disadvantageous to the winning party if the losing party has the most
assets in a state that has adopted this type of restrictive legislation.
CONCLUSION
As echoed by many legal scholars, politicians, and organizations,
including the American Bar Association, blanket prohibitions on the
consideration of foreign or international law go against our own fun282
damental judicial principles. This type of legislation is not a solution
but rather exacerbates the problem. In effect, legislation of this type
will infringe on party autonomy and will create many of the unintended consequences discussed above.
The irony of this type of legislation is that it seeks to protect
United States citizens and their constitutional rights, but it in fact infringes upon them. In cases of similar legislation, as that enacted in
Oklahoma or the proposed legislation in Mississippi, the statutes facially discriminate against those individuals practicing Sharia, thus
infringing on the protections afforded by the First Amendment (Free
Exercise Clause).
In some cases, this type of legislation will create a hostile environment for United States citizens attempting to enforce a judgment
283
in a foreign state and will create a larger backlog in the nation’s
courts as parties avoid arbitration and other alternative dispute

282 See, e.g., ABA Resolution 113A (Aug. 8, 2011), https://docs.google.com/a/fiu.edu/
viewer?a=v&q=cache:oA-Ee37bhlkJ:www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/house
_of_delegates/resolutions/2011_hod_annual_meeting_113a.authcheckdam.doc+&hl=en&gl=us&
pid=bl&srcid=ADGEESjTzFSWK809wDSlY9wox4ef0VyditVx5bNrhatF-pka44WAWrxqBcqHrg
dawN9waLLAl9VNRA0uIUHEGflKDGnW4pPxeBZTPMed5h_EWw14pMe1lDPI4PLqkw5Y
hz9vVQ4BoF7Y&sig=AHIEtbRpHaffJYK37_obUomTyu6WdaWRKg (opposing federal or
state laws imposing blanket prohibitions on consideration or use by courts or arbitral tribunals
of foreign or international law).
283 This is because judicial comity requires reciprocal recognition of foreign judgments.
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mechanisms out of the fear that their decisions will not be enforced by
a court in the United States.
A few things are apparent from the push to pass this type of legislation: (1) there exists a mistrust of the nation’s courts, (2) proposed
legislation is a result of political maneuver with no credible or legitimate basis, and (3) “anti-Sharia” legislation serves only to create fur284
ther ethnic tension between U.S. Muslims and non-Muslims.
The bottom line is that these laws are redundant and unnecessary.
The Constitution and the laws in place already provide protection
from the enforcement of any law or contract that would run afoul to
the U.S. Constitution or laws. State legislatures across the country
have begun to recognize this reality as most of the bills have died in
285
committees or have failed adoption in past legislative sessions.

284 See, e.g., Brian Schultz, Bills of Imitation: Who is Behind the “anti-sharia” Movement?,
IMAGINE 2050 (Apr. 21, 2011), http://imagine2050.newcomm.org/2011/04/21/bills-of-imitationwho-is-behind-the-”anti-sharia”-movement/; Abraham H. Foxman, “anti-sharia” Bill: Bigotry by
Any Other Name, N.J. JEWISH NEWS, available at http://njjewishnews.com/article/6192/”antisharia”-bills-bigotry-by-any-other-name#.T2EJ2MxYKKx; Rabbi Allen S. Maller, Orthodox Jews
and Muslims Unite to Fight “anti-sharia” Law, IVIEWS.COM (Mar. 9 2012),
http://www.iviews.com/Articles/articles.asp?ref=IV1203-5038.
285 See, e.g., S.B. 1360, 2012 114th Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2012); H.B. 1209, 2012 114th Reg. Sess. (Fla.
2012); H.B. 3220, 2011 8th Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 2011).

